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Abstract
Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks has two-fold implications. First, each wireless node does not excessively
and greedily inject traffic to the shared wireless channel. Second, intermediate nodes voluntarily relay traffic for
upstream nodes towards the destination at the cost of its own private resource. Such an assumption supports almost
all existing research when it comes to protocol design in ad hoc networks. We believe that without appropriate
incentive mechanisms, the nodes are inherently selfish (unwilling to contribute its private resource to relay traffic)
and greedy (unfairly sharing the wireless channel). In this paper, we present a price pair mechanism to arbitrate
resource allocation and to provide incentives simultaneously such that cooperation is promoted and the desired global
optimal network operating point is reached by convergence with a fully decentralized self-optimizing algorithm. Such
desired network-wide global optimum is characterized with the concept of Nash bargaining solution, which not only
provides the Pareto optimal point for the network, but is also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory.
We simulate the price pair mechanism and report encouraging results to support and validate our theoretical claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nodes in wireless ad hoc networks not only share the wireless channel in the same local neighborhood, but
also relay traffic so that destinations multiple hops away may be reached. In almost all previous work related to
wireless ad hoc networks, the following two fundamental assumptions are made. First, nodes do not excessively
inject traffic to the locally shared wireless channel. Second, intermediate nodes voluntarily relay traffic for upstream
nodes towards the destination. In this paper, we believe that such assumptions may not hold in realistic scenarios,
at least not without appropriate incentive-based mechanisms. In fact, they behave in quite the contrary fashion:
they are both greedy when it comes to sharing public resource (wireless channel), and selfish when it comes to
contributing private resource (such as battery energy). In other words, the network may fail to function at all in
realistic scenarios once neither assumption holds.
The only way to solve these problems is to design appropriate incentive mechanisms to not only encourage
cooperative behavior of selfish nodes, but also curb unfair and excessive resource usage when sharing a common
resource pool, such as a shared channel. Such designs of incentives should optimize towards a clearly specified
objective, which is a desired optimal operating point of the wireless network. At such an optimal point, resources
are shared fairly, and the levels of cooperation are adequate for all necessary data communications and network
functions. This paper exactly targets this critical issue in multi-hop wireless networks.
Our original contributions are two-fold. First, we clearly characterize the desired network-wide optimal operating
point using a game theoretic framework, based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). NBS naturally
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2encapsulates two favorable properties: (1) Pareto efficiency in terms of resource usage; and (2) a set of fairness
axioms with respect to resource allocations. Using this framework, the problem of finding the desired globally
optimal operating point may be formulated as a non-linear optimization problem. Second, we propose a decentralized
algorithm that uses a price pair mechanism to arbitrate incentives. With a pair of prices, localized self-optimization
by individual nodes naturally converges to globally optimal network operating points. Within the price pair, the
channel price regulates greedy usage of the shared wireless channel, while the relay price encourages traffic
relaying. Effectively, our price pair mechanism transforms non-cooperative behavior in wireless ad hoc networks
to a cooperative game, whose optimal operating points demonstrate more advantageous properties than the usual
Nash Equilibrium in typical non-cooperative environments.
The essence of our paper is to integrate the mechanisms that use pricing as signals to (1) fairly allocate resources;
and (2) adequately incentivize cooperative behavior. Though there exists previous work towards either one of these
objectives, we are not aware of existing work that integrates both prices into a coherent framework. Such integration
becomes more complicated if we consider the unique channel contention characteristics in wireless ad hoc networks,
where the traffic flows contend in multiple contention cliques. Considerations of such unique complications in ad
hoc networks are beyond all of the existing work in the area of pricing or incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II presents some preliminaries before formal treatment
of this topic. Sec. III defines the desired network operating points using the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution.
We present the distributed algorithm in Sec. IV. We show simulation results in Sec. V, present related work in
Sec. VI and finally conclude the paper in Sec. VII.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
A. Characterizing wireless ad hoc networks
We consider a wireless ad hoc network which consists of a set of nodes N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. In this network, only
nodes that are within the transmission range of each other can communicate directly and form a wireless link. We
model such a network as a bidirectional graph GN = (N ;L), where L = f1; 2; :::; Lg is the set of wireless links.
In such a network, a wireless node i 2 N may establish an end-to-end flow, or simply flow, fi with rate xi to
another node. Flow fi is assumed to be elastic: it requires a minimum rate of xmi and a maximum rate of xMi , i.e.,
xmi  xi  xMi . In general, fi flows through multiple hops in the network, passing a set of wireless links. We use
this set of wireless links to represent fi, i.e., fi  L. We denote the set of relaying nodes for flow fi as R(fi), and
the destination of fi as D(fi). For simplicity of exposition, we further define H(fi) = R(fi) [ fD(fi); ig as the
set of nodes fi traverses, and K(fi) = H(fi)−fig. A single-hop data transmission along a particular wireless link
is referred to as a subflow, and is a part of a flow. Several subflows from different flows along the same wireless
link form an aggregated subflow.
In such a network, nodes compete for two types of resources: shared wireless channel and individual nodes’ re-
laying cost (such as energy). The availability of these resources constrains the solution space of resource allocations.
We proceed to analyze the characteristics of both types of resources.
B. Shared wireless channel: location-dependent contention
The shared-medium multi-hop nature of wireless ad hoc networks presents unique characteristics of location-
dependent contention and spatial reuse of spectrum. Compared with wireline networks where flows contend only
3at the router with other simultaneous flows through the same router (contention in the time domain), the unique
characteristics of multi-hop wireless networks show that, flows also compete for shared channel bandwidth if they
are within the transmission ranges of each other (contention in the spatial domain).
In particular, two subflows contend with each other if either the source or destination of one subflow is within
the transmission range of the source or destination of the other1. The locality of wireless transmissions implies that
the degree of contention for the shared medium is location-dependent. On the other hand, two subflows that are
geographically far away have the potential to transmit simultaneously, reusing the wireless channel.
We now formulate the resource constraints that reflect the unique characteristics of wireless ad hoc networks.
First, let us consider a set of mutually contending subflows. In this set, only one subflow can transmit at a time.
Intuitively, the aggregated rate of all subflows in this set can not exceed the channel capacity. Formally, we consider
a subflow contention graph. In this graph, each vertex corresponds to an aggregated subflow in the original network.
Each edge in the graph denotes that two aggregated subflows which correspond to the two vertices, contend with
each other. Formally, let VC = [i2N fi  L be the set of aggregated subflows in network GN , then a bidirectional
graph GC = (VC ; EC) is a subflow contention graph of network GN .
In a graph, a complete subgraph is referred to as a clique. A maximal clique is defined as a clique that is not
contained in any other cliques2. In a subflow contention graph, the vertices in a maximal clique represent a maximal
set of mutually contending subflows. Intuitively, each maximal clique in a subflow contention graph represents a
“maximal distinct contention region”, since at most one subflow in the clique can transmit at any time and adding
any other subflows into this clique will introduce the possibility of simultaneous transmissions. For simplicity, we
use the set of vertices in a clique to represent the clique, and denote it as q. Furthermore, we denote the set of all
maximal cliques in a subflow contention graph as Q. We illustrate above concepts with an example in Sec. II-D.
We proceed to consider the problem of allocating rates to wireless links. We claim that a rate allocation y =
(yl; l 2 L) is feasible, if there exists a collision-free transmission schedule that allocates yl to l. We now formalize
the condition implied by such a feasible rate allocation.
Lemma 1. If a rate allocation y = (yl; l 2 L) is feasible, then the following condition is satisfied:
8q 2 Q;
X
l2q
yl  C (1)
where C is the channel capacity.
Eq. (1) gives an upper bound on the rate allocations to the wireless links. In practice, however, such a bound
may not be tight, especially with carrier-sensing-multiple-access-based wireless networks (such as IEEE 802.11).
In this case, we introduce Cq, the achievable channel capacity at a clique q. More formally, if
P
l2q yl  Cq then
y = (yl; l 2 L) is feasible3. To this end, we observe that each maximal clique may be regarded as an independent
channel resource unit with capacity Cq. It motivates the use of the maximal clique as a basic resource unit for
pricing in wireless ad hoc networks, as compared to the notion of a link in wireline networks.
We now proceed to consider resource constraints on rate allocations among flows. To facilitate discussions, we
define a clique-flow matrix R = fRqig, where Rqi = jq \ fij represents the number of subflows that flow f has
1If we assume that the interference range is greater than the transmission range, the contention model can be straightforwardly extended.
2Note that maximal clique has a different definition from maximum clique of a graph, which is the maximal clique with the largest number
of vertices.
3The measurement of Cq has been studied in both theoretical and practical settings in [1], [2], [3], [4].
4in the clique q. If we treat a maximal clique as an independent resource, then the clique-flow matrix R represents
the “resource usage pattern” of each flow. Let the vector C = (Cq; q 2 Q) be the vector of achievable channel
capacities in each of the cliques. Constraints with respect to rate allocations to end-to-end flows in wireless ad hoc
networks are presented in the following theorem.
Proposition 1. In a wireless ad hoc network GN = (N ;L), there exists a feasible rate allocation x = (xi; i 2 N ),
if and only if Rx  C.
Proof: It is obvious that Rx  C , 8q 2 Q, Pi2N Rqixi  Cq. By the definition of R, we have Pi2N Rqixi =P
l2q yl. The result follows naturally from Lemma 1 and its following discussions. ut
C. Costs of Relays
Relaying traffic for upstream nodes apparently incurs cost, since localized resources need to be consumed, such
as energy, CPU cycle, and memory space. Without loss of generality, we use energy levels on each node as an
example to characterize such costs of relays. Given a minimum expected lifetime in the network, each node j has a
budget on its energy consumption rate, denoted as Ej . Here, we consider two types of energy consumption related
to packet transmission: (1) er as the energy consumed for receiving a unit flow; (2) es as the energy consumed for
transmitting a unit flow. Then the energy consumption at node j is xjes +
P
i:j2R(fi) xi(e
r + es)+
P
i:j=D(fi)
xie
r
.
As the energy consumption rate can not exceed the energy budget, we have the following relation:
xje
s +
X
i:j2R(fi)
xi(er + es) +
X
i:j=D(fi)
xie
r  Ei (2)
We now proceed to define a N N matrix B as follows.
Bji =
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
es if j = i
er + es if node j forwards packets for flow fi,
i.e., j 2 R(fi)
er if node j is the destination of flow fi,
i.e., j = D(fi)
0 otherwise
(3)
B specifies the relaying relation among nodes in the ad hoc network. To summarize, the local constraint on
energy can be formalized as follows:
B  x  E (4)
where E = (Ej ; j 2 N ) is the energy consumption budget vector.
Table I shows a summary of important notations introduced in this section.
D. Example
Here we illustrate the above concepts using an example. The network topology and the flows in the example are
shown in Fig. 1(a). The corresponding subflow contention graph is shown in Fig. 1(b). In this example, there are three
maximal cliques in the contention graph: q1 = ff1; 2g; f3; 2g; f3; 4g; f3; 6gg; q2 = ff3; 2g; f3; 4g; f4; 5g; f3; 6gg
and q3 = ff3; 2g; f3; 4g; f3; 6g; f6; 7gg. Let us use yij to denote the aggregated rate of all subflows along node i
and j. For example, y12 = x1 + x2 + x7, y23 = x1 + x3 + x7, y36 = x6 + x7. In each clique, the aggregated rate
can not exceed the channel capacity, i.e.,
5Notation Definition
i; j 2 N = f1; :::; Ng Network nodes
fi; R(fi);D(fi) The flow from source node
i, fi’s relaying nodes and
destination
H(fi) R(fi) [ fD(fi); ig
K(fi) H(fi)− fig
l 2 L = f1; :::; Lg Wireless links
q 2 Q = f1; :::; Qg Maximal cliques
x = (xi; i 2 N ) Rate allocation vector
xm;xM Minimum (or maximum)
rate vector
C = (Cq; q 2 Q) Clique capacity vector
E = (Ej; j 2 N ) Energy budget vector
A = (Aqi)QN Channel constraint matrix
B = (Bji)NN Energy constraint matrix
TABLE I
MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS
1 2 3 4 5
7
6
1 5
2 1
3 2
4 3
5 3
6 5
7 1
{4,5}
{3,6} {3,4}
{1,2}
{3,2}
{6,7}
q2
q1 q3
(a) Network topology (b) Subflow contention graph
Fig. 1. Example of wireless ad hoc network and its subflow contention graph
y12 + y32 + y34 + y36  C1 (5)
y32 + y34 + y45 + y36  C2 (6)
y32 + y34 + y36 + y67  C3 (7)
When it comes to end-to-end flow rate allocation, the resource constraint imposed by shared wireless channel is
as follows: 0
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In this example, let the energy consumed for receiving er = 1, for transmitting es = 2. Then the energy constraint
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x  E:
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we characterize the desired network-wide optimal operating point using a game theoretic frame-
work, based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). NBS naturally encapsulates two favorable prop-
erties: (1) Pareto efficiency in terms of resource usage; and (2) a set of fairness axioms with respect to resource
allocations. Using this framework, the problem of finding the desired globally optimal operating point may be
formulated as a non-linear optimization problem. We show how such a global optimization problem may be
decomposed into localized greedy optimization problems via a price pair.
A. Nash Bargaining Solution: a game theoretical formulation
We present the basic concepts and results of Nash bargaining solutions (NBS) from game theory [5] and show
how it can characterize and formulate the desired network operation point, towards which our price pair mechanism
should converge.
The basic setting of the problem is as follows: The set of nodes N in the wireless ad hoc network GN constitutes
a set of players in the game. They compete for the use of a fixed amount of resources (wireless channel and costs
of relays such as energy). The rate allocation x = (xi; i 2 N ) is the utility vector of all players in the game. Let
S  RN be the set of all feasible utility vectors. We assume that S is a non-empty convex closed and bounded
set. Further, we denote the initial agreement point of the game as x, which is the guaranteed utilities of players
without any cooperation in order to enter the game.
In such a problem setting, a bargaining problem is any (S;x) where fx 2 Sjx  xg 6= ;. In other words,
a bargaining problem is actually a set of rate allocations x that is acceptable to all players. Let B = f(S;x)g
denote the set of all bargaining problems. It then follows that a bargaining solution is any function ’ : B ! RN ,
so that 8(S;x) 2 B, ’(S;x) 2 S. A bargaining solution actually specifies finding a rate allocation within all
acceptable allocations. A natural question about the bargaining solution is how such a function ’ is to be defined.
There are two reasonable properties desired for a bargaining solution: (1) efficient use of resources; and (2) fair
allocation among all players. These two conditions are precisely encapsulated by the concept of Nash Bargaining
Solution defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Bargaining Solution). A bargaining solution ’ : B ! RN is a Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS), if x = ’(S;x) satisfies the Nash Axioms A1-A6.
A1 (Individual rationality) x  x;
A2 (Feasibility) x 2 S;
A3 (Pareto optimality) If 8x 2 S;x  x, then x = x;
7A4 (Independence of irrelevant alternatives) If x 2 T  S and x = ’(S;x), then x = ’(T;x);
A5 (Independence of linear transformation) Let T be obtained from S by the linear transformation (x) with
(x)i = aixi + bi; ai; bi > 0; i = 1; 2; :::; N: (8)
Then if ’(S;x) = x, then ’(T; (x)) = (x);
A6 (Symmetry) Suppose S is symmetric with respect to a subset J  f1; 2; :::; Ng of indices, then ’ is symmetry,
which means that if x 2 S and for i; j 2 J , xi = xj , then xi = xj .
The above axioms encapsulate both the concept of Pareto optimality (A3) and the concept of fairness (A4-
A6). Pareto optimality means that there is no other point which gives strict superior utility for all the players
simultaneously. The definition of Pareto optimality reflects the condition of efficient use of resources, where there
are no “idle” resources in the network. Axioms A4-A6 represent the axioms of fairness. The independence of
irrelevant alternatives axiom (A4) states that, if a bargaining solution x to a problem on an enlarged feasible set
S can be found on a restricted domain T , then it is also the bargaining solution to the problem on the restricted
set. The independence of linear transformation axiom (A5) states that the bargaining solution is scale invariant, i.e.,
the bargaining solution is unchanged if the utility is changed using a positive linear transformation. The symmetry
axiom (A6) states that the bargaining point does not depend on the specific labels, i.e., players with the same initial
points and objectives will realize the same utility.
The existing work in game theory [5] and its application in wireline communication networks [6] establish the
following results for NBS.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique function ’ defined on all bargaining problems (S;x) that satisfies axioms
A1-A6, i.e., a unique Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) exists. Moreover, the unique solution x is a unique vector
that solves the following maximization problems:
N1 : max
x
Y
i2N
(xi − xi ); (9)
Equivalently,
N2 : max
x
X
i2N
ln(xi − xi ): (10)
X
X *
S
x1
x2
(0,0)
1
1
S
Fig. 2. Example of Nash bargaining solution
Above concepts are illustrated in Fig. 2, where the utility space of a two-player game is plotted. In the example,
two players are competing for a unit resource. The initial agreement point x = (0; 0), and the NBS x = (1=2; 1=2).
8B. Network operating points: optimal and fair rate allocations
We assume that each player involved in the game can be guaranteed with its minimum rate vector xm. Thus, the
minimum rate vector xm can be regarded as an initial agreement point of the game x. From the discussions in
Sec. III-A, it is clear that the NBS formulates the desired network operation point, which is fair to all nodes while
efficient from the network’s point of view. Thus, the problem of finding the globally optimal resource allocation
is transformed to solving the NBS of its corresponding game, which is the solution of the following nonlinear
optimization problem by Proposition 2.
P : maximize
X
i2N
ln(xi − xmi ) (11)
subject to A  x  C (12)
B  x  E (13)
over xm  x  xM (14)
The objective function in Eq. (11) of the optimization problem corresponds to the optimization problem whose
solution is NBS. The constraints of the optimization problem Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) are the constraints from the
shared wireless channel and costs of relays, respectively, as discussed in Sec. II.
Note that the objective function Pi2N ln(xi − xmi ) is strictly concave. In addition, the feasible region of
the optimization problem is non-empty, convex, and compact. By non-linear optimization theory, there exists a
maximizing value of argument x for the above optimization problem. Let us consider the Lagrangian form of the
optimization problem P:
L(x;;) (15)
=
X
i2N
ln(xi − xmi ) + (C −Ax) + (E −Bx)
where  = (q ; q 2 Q),  = (j ; j 2 N ) are two vectors of Lagrange multipliers. The first-order Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality of problem P. Thus, for i 2 N , the following conditions hold:
1
xi − xmi
−
X
q2Q
qAqi −
X
j2N
jBji = 0 (16)
(C −Ax) = 0;  0 (17)
(E −Bx) = 0;  0 (18)
xm  x  xM (19)
In the Lagrangian form shown in Eq. (15), the Lagrange multipliers q can be regarded as the implied cost of
unit flow accessing the channel at the maximal clique q. In other words, q is the shadow price of clique q, called
channel price. This price corresponds to the shared channel resource constraint. The Lagrange multipliers j can be
regarded as the implied relay cost of unit flow at node j. In other words, j is the shadow price of relay at node j,
called relay price. This pair of prices (;) will be used as incentives so that localized self-optimizing decision
can implement the global optimum. In particular, the price  will signal a “charge” (contrary to incentives) to the
9shared channel usage and regulate the greedy behavior, while the price  will provide incentives to traffic relays
at intermediate nodes and regulate the selfish behavior of wireless nodes.
Let us denote
i =
X
q2Q
qAqi (20)
i =
X
j2N
jBji (21)
Clearly,
i =
X
q:fi\q 6=;
qAqi (22)
=
X
l:l2fi
X
q:l2q
q (23)
i =
X
j2H(fi)
jBji (24)
= i e
s +
X
j2R(fi)
j (e
s + er) + D(fi)e
r (25)
Then i and 

i are the prices for node i, which is the source of flow fi, for accessing shared channels and
relay services, respectively. For channel usage, node i needs to pay for all the maximal cliques that it traverses.
For each clique, the price to pay is the product of the number of wireless links that fi traverses in this clique
and the shadow price of this clique as in Eq. (22). Alternatively, the price of flow fi is the aggregated price of
all its subflows. For each subflow, its price is the aggregated price of the maximal cliques that it belongs to as in
Eq. (23). Note that such a pricing policy for end-to-end flows is fundamentally different from the pricing models
in wireline networks, where a flow’s price is the aggregation of the link prices which it traverses. Such difference
is rooted at the nature of the shared medium — the interference and spatial reuse of wireless channel in an ad hoc
network. For traffic relay services, node i needs to pay for the relay costs of all relaying nodes of fi, including
itself and the destination. Using flow f1 as an example, the channel price model is illustrated in Fig. 3(a) and the
relay price model is illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The channel price for f1 is 1 = 31 +32 +23 ; and the relay price
1 = 2

1 + 3

2 + 3

3 + 3

4 + 

5 .
1 2 3 4 5
7
6
m
a
1
m
a
2
m
a
3
f1
(a) channel price (b) relay price
1 2 3 4 5
7
6
m
b
1 m
b
2 m
b
3 m
b
4 m
b
5
m
b
6
m
b
7
f1
Fig. 3. An example of the price pair mechanism
To summarize, we have the following results with respect to the globally optimal network operating point.
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Theorem 1. There exists a unique solution to problem P (i.e., unique NBS), which is characterized as follows:
There exist two vectors  = (q ; q 2 Q),  = (j ; j 2 N ) such that
xi = [
1
i + 

i
+ xmi ]
xMi
xmi
, for i 2 N (26)
(C −Ax) = 0;  0 (27)
(E −Bx) = 0;  0 (28)
where [z]ba = maxfminfz; bg; ag.
C. Local strategies: self-optimizing decisions
With the understanding of the global optimal point, we now study how this point can be achieved in a distributed
manner by localized self-optimizing decisions at each individual node. The key to this goal is to use the pair of
prices (;) as signals to coordinate the distributed decisions.
First, we study the conditions that the prices need to satisfy in order to incentivize local node decisions so that
they could implement the global network optimum. Let us consider the following problems:
Channel(A;C;):
maximize
X
i2N
i xi (29)
subject to Ax  C (30)
over xm  x  xM (31)
where i is a function of , as defined in Eq. (20). Problem Channel(A;C;) maximizes the total revenue of
channel based on charging i per unit of bandwidth to user i subject to the channel capacity constraint.
Relay(B;E;):
maximize
X
i2N
i xi (32)
subject to Bx  E (33)
over xm  x  xM (34)
where i is a function of  , as defined in Eq. (21). Problem Relay(B;E;) maximizes the total relay revenue
of all nodes subject to the relay cost constraint at each individual node.
Now let us consider a local self-optimizing decision at each node i which corresponds to the following problem:
Nodei(i ; 

i ; 

i ):
maximize ln(xi − xmi )− i xi − i xi + i Ei (35)
over xmi  xi  xMi (36)
The relationship between localized node decision and the global optimal network operating point is then given
as follows.
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Theorem 2: There exist vectors ,  and x such that
1) xi is the unique solution to Nodei(i ; i ; i );
2) x solves Channel(A;C;) ;
3) x solves Relay(B;E;);
Then x also solves problem P.
The proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix A. Let us denote
(xi) = ln(xi − xmi )− i xi − i xi + i Ei (37)
Now we show that (xi) reflects the “net benefit” of node i and problem Nodei(i ; 

i ; 

i ) maximizes the node
i’s net benefit. This claim is based on the following two observations. First, node i does not pay its relay cost
to itself from a local point of view, while the flow relay price i , which is defined from a global point of view,
contains the price of relay for itself. Thus from a local point of view, the cost of node i is:
i xi +
X
j2K(fi)
Bji = (i + 

i )xi − i esxi (38)
And the revenue of node i is: X
j:i2K(fj)
i Bijxj = 

i
X
j:i2H(fj)
Bijxj − i esxi (39)
Second, from Theorem 2 we have
i = 0 , if
X
j:i2H(fj)
Bijxj < Ei (40)
i > 0 , if
X
j:i2H(fj)
Bijxj = Ei (41)
Thus it is clear that (xi) reflects the “net benefit” of node i, which is the difference between utility, revenue and
cost.
IV. ALGORITHM
Although the global problem P can be mathematically solvable in a centralized fashion, it is impractical for
realistic operations in wireless ad hoc networks. In this section, we present a distributed iterative algorithm for
price calculation and resource arbitration. We show that the iterative algorithm converges to the global optimum,
and maximizes the local net benefit at each node simultaneously.
A. Dual Problem
In order to achieve a distributed solution, we first look at the dual problem of P as follows.
D : min
;0
D(;) (42)
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where
D(;)
= max
x
L(x;;)
= max
x
X
i2N
(ln(xi − xmi )− (i + i )xi + i Ei| {z }
(xi)
)
+
X
q2Q
qCq
Note that (xi) is node i’s “net benefit”. By the separation nature of Lagrangian form, maximizing L(x;;)
can be decomposed into separately maximizing (xi) for each node i 2 N (Sec. 3.4.2 in [7]). We now have
D(;) =
X
i2N
max
xmi xixMi
f(xi)g+
X
q2Q
q cq (43)
As () is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, a unique maximizer of (xi) exists when
d(xi)
dxi
=
1
xi − xmi
− (i + i ) = 0
We define the maximizer as follows:
xi(i ; 

i ) = arg max
xmi xixMi
f(xi)g (44)
Note that xi(i ; 

i ) is usually called demand function, which reflects the optimal rate for node i with channel
price as i and relay price as 

i .
B. Distributed Algorithm
We solve the dual problem D using the gradient projection method [7]. In this method,  and  are adjusted
in the opposite direction to the gradient rD(;):
q (t+ 1) = [

q (t)− γ
@D((t);(t))
@q
]+ (45)
j (t+ 1) = [

j (t)− γ
@D((t);(t))
@j
]+ (46)
where γ is the stepsize. D(;) is continuously differentiable since ln() is strictly concave [7]. Thus, it follows
that
@D(;)
@q
= Cq −
X
i:fi\q 6=;
xi(i ; 

i )Aqi (47)
@D(;)
@j
= Ej −
X
i:j2H(fi)
xi(i ; 

i )Bji (48)
Substituting Eq. (47) into (45) and (48) into (46), we have
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q (t+ 1) = (49)
[q (t) + γ(
X
i:fi\q 6=;
xi(i (t); 

i (t))Aqi − Cq)]+
j (t+ 1) = (50)
[j (t) + γ(
X
i:j2H(fi)
xi(i (t); 

i (t))Bji − Ej)]+
Eq. (49) and Eq. (50) reflect the law of supply and demand. If the demand for bandwidth at clique q exceeds
its supply Cq, the channel constraint is violated. Thus, the channel price q is raised. Otherwise, q is reduced.
Similarly, in Eq. (50), if the demand for energy at node j exceeds its budget Ej , the energy constraint is violated.
Thus, the relay price j is raised. Otherwise, 

j is reduced.
We summarize our algorithm in Table II, where clique q and node i are deemed as entities capable of computing
and communicating.
Clique Price Update (by clique q): At times t = 1; 2; : : :
1 Receive rates xi(t) from all flows fi where fi \ q 6= ;
2 Update price
q (t+ 1) = [q (t) + γ(
P
fi\q 6=; xi(t)Aqi − Cq)]+
3 Send q (t+ 1) to all flows fi where fi \ q 6= ;
Relay Price Update (by node j): At times t = 1; 2; : : :
1 Receive rates xi(t) from all flows fi where j 2 H(fi)
2 Update price
j (t+ 1) = [

j (t) + γ(
P
i:j2H(fi) xi(t)Bji − Ej)]+
3 Send j (t+ 1) to all flows fi where j 2 H(fi)
Rate Update (by node i): At times t = 1; 2; : : :
1 Receive channel prices q (t) from q where fi \ q 6= ;
2 Receive relay prices j (t) from j where j 2 H(fi)
3 Calculate
i =
P
q:fi\q 6=; 

qAqi
i =
P
j:j2H(fi) 

jBji
5 Adjust rate
xi(t+ 1) = xi(i ; 

i )
4 Send xi(t+ 1) to corresponding cliques.
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
We now show the property of this distributed iterative algorithm. Let us define Y (i) =
P
q Aqi +
P
j Bji,
and Y = maxi2N Y (i). Further, we define U(q) =
P
i2N Aqi and U = maxq2QU(q); V (j) =
P
i2N Bji and
V = maxj2N V (j); Z = maxf U; V g. Let i = (xMi − xmi )2 and  = maxi2N i.
Theorem 3 (Global convergence and optimality). Suppose 0 < γ < 2= Y Z. Starting from any initial rates
xm  x(0)  xM , and prices (0)  0 and (0)  0, every accumulation point (x;;) of the sequence
(x(t);(t);(t)) generated by the algorithm in Table II is primal-dual optimal.
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The reader is referred to Appendix B for a detailed proof. Though there exists a unique maximizer x to the
problem P, there may be multiple dual optimal prices, since only the flow price is constrained at optimality according
to U 0f (x

f ) = 

i
+i

. Theorem 3 does not guarantee convergence to a unique vector (x;;), though any
convergent subsequence leads to the optimal rate allocation x.
C. Implementation Issues
In the above iterative algorithm, a maximal clique is regarded as a network element that can carry out certain
network functions. In particular, it assumes that a maximal clique q can perform the following tasks for price
calculation and resource allocation: (1) obtain the aggregated bandwidth demand within the clique q; (2) calculate
the per-clique shadow price q ; and (3) notify the price q to the flows that pass through it. However, a maximal
clique is only a concept defined based on subflow contention graph. To deploy the algorithm in an actual ad hoc
network, the above tasks of a maximal clique need to be carried out by the nodes that constitute the clique in a
distributed fashion. For the implementation details, readers are referred to Appendix C.
The price pair based self-optimizing algorithm needs the support from a virtual credit system to enforce the
pricing signal. As this paper mainly focuses on how to calculate the incentive price, the design of such a virtual
credit system is beyond the scope of this paper. Interesting readers are referred to [8] [9] for these issues.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We illustrate our price pair mechanism and the distributed algorithm via simulation. The network used in the
simulation has 20 nodes deployed on a 600 600 square meter region as shown in Fig. 4. Such a network has 10
cliques that represent maximal contending regions in the wireless channel as shown in Table IV. Each node sets
up a connection with a randomly selected destination and delivers traffic via shortest path routing. The flows and
their routes are shown in Table III. We use uniform achievable channel capacities Cq = 1Mbps for all cliques q in
the simulation. The default initial energy level for all nodes is 432 Joules. The transmission energy consumption
is 2 10−7J/bit and the receiving energy consumption is 10−7J/bit. The network is expected to last 2 hours with a
energy budget of 0:06J/sec for each node. The minimum and maximum rate requirement of flows are xmi = 0Mbps
and xMi = 1Mbps for all flows fi.
A. Convergence
We first show the convergence behavior of our iterative algorithm. In the simulation, the initial values are xi(0) = 0
Kbps, q (0) = 

j (0) = 0:01 for all i; q; j. The step size that ensures the convergence is set to γ = 10−6. As shown
in Fig. 5, the algorithm converges to a global network equilibrium within about 300 iterations. At the equilibrium
point, the optimal resource allocation and prices are listed in Table V. We observe that node 1, 10, 11 and 17 are
the bottleneck relaying nodes and clique 1 is the bottleneck channel resource. They, therefore, have positive prices.
We have also experimented with different sets of initial values for the rates and prices, and the results have been
coherent with our illustrated example.
B. Impact of resource capacity
We further illustrate the roles and interactions of the channel and relay prices, by repeating the simulation with
different values of energy budget E and channel capacity C. In the experiment, the energy budgets of two bottleneck
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Fig. 4. Random topology used in the simulation
Flow ID Route
0 0 ! 8 ! 15
1 1 ! 10
2 2 ! 8 ! 0 ! 6 ! 19
3 3 ! 4 ! 1 ! 11
4 4 ! 1 ! 11 ! 0 ! 6
5 5 ! 1 ! 11 ! 0 ! 17
6 6 ! 0 ! 11 ! 12 ! 14
7 7 ! 1 ! 10
8 8 ! 13
9 9 ! 10
10 10 ! 14 ! 12
11 11 ! 1
12 12 ! 11
13 13 ! 18
14 14 ! 12 ! 11
15 15 ! 11
16 16 ! 6 ! 0 ! 11 ! 1 ! 4
17 17 ! 19
18 18 ! 0 ! 6
19 19 ! 6 ! 0 ! 11 ! 1 ! 4
TABLE III
FLOWS AND THEIR ROUTES
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Clique ID Subflows in the clique
0 (0; 6); (0; 8); (0; 11); (0; 17); (0; 18); (6; 16); (6; 19)
(17; 19)
1 (0; 6); (0; 8); (0; 11); (0; 17); (0; 18); (1; 11); (2; 8)
(8; 13); (8; 15); (11; 12); (11; 15); (13; 18)
2 (0; 6); (0; 8); (0; 11); (0; 17); (0; 18); (6; 16); (6; 19)
(8; 13); (13; 18)
3 (0; 11); (1; 11); (2; 8); (8; 15); (11; 12); (11; 15)
(12; 14)
4 (0; 11); (1; 10); (1; 11); (11; 12); (11; 15); (12; 14)
5 (1; 10); (1; 11); (10; 14); (11; 12); (12; 14)
6 (1; 10); (1; 11); (9; 10); (10; 14); (12; 14)
7 (0; 11); (1; 4); (1; 5); (1; 7); (1; 10); (1; 11); (11; 12)
(11; 15)
8 (1; 4); (1; 5); (1; 7); (1; 10); (1; 11); (10; 14); (11; 12)
9 (1; 4); (1; 5); (1; 7); (1; 10); (1; 11); (3; 4); (9; 10)
(10; 14)
TABLE IV
MAXIMAL CLIQUES
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Fig. 5. Convergence of the algorithm on the network shown in Fig. 1
nodes 1 and 11 are changed to E1 = E11 = 0:1J/sec. The convergence behavior and the equilibrium results are
shown in Fig. 6 and Table VI respectively. We observe that the relay prices at node 1 and 11 have been decreasing,
since more energy is available at these two nodes, causing less competition with respect to energy. At the same
time, we also observe that the channel price has increased, since the decreasing relay cost increases the rate demand
and causes more competition for the channel.
We now show two special cases where the role of one price in the price pair can implicitly be assumed by the
other. In the first case, Ei = 0:04J/sec for all i. The result is plotted in Fig. 7. From the figure, we observe that the
channel prices eventually converge to 0, with the increase of relay prices. It shows that in this scenario, the energy
constraints are the dominant factors in the network. Thus, when the relay prices give adequate incentives to these
energy constrained nodes to relay appropriate amount of traffic, the wireless channel is naturally shared among all
nodes in a fair manner. In the second case, we show a scenario where the shared wireless channel capacity is the
dominant factor. In this experiment, the energy budget is set to be sufficiently large: Ei = 0:2J/sec for all i. As
shown in Fig. 8, we can observe that the channel prices play a dominant role in arbitrating resource contention
among different nodes.
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Node/Flow ID Flow rate (Kbps) Relay price Clique ID Channel price
0 39:03 0 0 0:000000
1 162:03 0:005898 1 0:011267
2 26:02 0 2 0:000000
3 35:02 0 3 0:000000
4 19:89 0 4 0:000000
5 19:49 0 5 0:000000
6 24:04 0 6 0:000000
7 91:26 0 7 0:000000
8 78:07 0 8 0:000000
9 189:37 0 9 0:000000
10 150:01 0:004073
11 52:68 0:002871
12 72:99 0
13 78:07 0
14 66:28 0
15 72:99 0
16 19:89 0
17 490:25 0:001713
18 39:03 0
19 19:89 0
TABLE V
EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND PRICES
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Fig. 6. Convergence when more energy is available at node 11 and 1.
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Fig. 7. Energy is dominant factor
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Node/Flow ID Flow rate (Kbps) Relay price Clique ID Channel price
0 35:24 0:000000 0 0:000000
1 117:45 0:001654 1 0:014187
2 23:49 0:000000 2 0:000000
3 52:21 0:000000 3 0:000000
4 21:04 0:000000 4 0:000000
5 20:30 0:000000 5 0:000000
6 23:49 0:000000 6 0:000000
7 98:34 0:000000 7 0:000000
8 70:48 0:000000 8 0:000000
9 192:10 0:000000 9 0:000000
10 96:05 0:005206
11 63:12 0:000000
12 70:48 0:000000
13 70:48 0:000000
14 70:48 0:000000
15 70:48 0:000000
16 21:04 0:000000
17 289:84 0:001725
18 35:24 0:000000
19 21:04 0:000000
TABLE VI
EQUILIBRIUM RATES AND PRICES WHEN MORE ENERGY IS AVAILABLE AT NODE 11 AND 1.
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Fig. 8. Channel is dominant factor
C. Network performance with incentives
We now show the performance of the network as the price pair is used as incentives. In particular, we compare
the case where all nodes follow the incentive signals with the case where there exist nodes that deviate from the
signals. In the latter case, the node with ID 3 deviates from the price pair signal by increasing its transmission rate
by 60 Kbps. Table VII shows the results of such a comparison, including the following performance metrics:
 Throughput – the average transmission rate of a flow over the network operation time;
 Cost – the total cost (price  rate) over the network operation time, i.e., costi =
P
t(

i (t) + 

i (t)) xi(t);
 Revenue – the total revenue of a node from relaying, i.e., revenuei =
P
t 

i (t)
P
j xi(t)Bij ;
 Remaining energy – the remaining energy at the end of network operation.
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From the results, we have the following observations. First, from a single node point of view, though node 3 has
a higher throughput when deviating from the incentive signals, it is also charged with a much higher cost, which
leads to a decrease of net benefit (utility from throughput + revenue - cost) by 20233:08. Second, from the point of
view of the entire network, the total utility of the network decreases from 78:27 to 77:31; the total remaining energy
decreases from 3839:91J to 3701:55J. We can draw the conclusion that, a node that deviates from the price-pair
incentive signal does not only cause the entire network to operate at a suboptimal point, but also decreases the net
benefit of itself – which is unacceptable for a rational node.
Follow incentives Deviate incentives
ID Throughput Cost Revenue Remaining energy Throughput Cost Revenue Remaining energy
0 44:37 7197:57 209:89 15:27 43:68 7197:58 138:41 45:77
1 63:00 7197:49 25440:83 0:41 39:07 7197:92 47161:32 0:00
2 29:58 7197:30 1:49 389:40 29:12 7197:32 1:48 390:05
3 31:40 7197:33 1:81 386:77 81:35 27443:76 14:20 314:84
4 16:60 7197:52 5:75 316:34 13:35 7197:71 33:37 217:79
5 16:14 7197:55 1:12 408:75 13:06 7197:74 0:99 413:18
6 23:49 7197:21 12:81 218:69 23:75 7197:19 11:51 236:12
7 45:91 7197:29 2:70 365:87 27:37 7197:77 2:17 392:57
8 89:21 7197:66 37:43 143:78 87:66 7197:68 36:08 148:47
9 245:19 7196:72 16:07 78:91 266:37 7196:65 18:40 48:42
10 122:52 7196:42 17545:82 0:59 133:15 7196:34 16141:22 0:62
11 43:59 7197:66 12586:52 0:71 36:36 7197:80 11148:97 0:74
12 70:68 7197:37 45:18 38:77 71:38 7197:34 39:57 27:98
13 89:41 7197:71 21:75 239:01 87:85 7197:72 19:99 242:36
14 70:59 7196:80 14:16 48:77 71:30 7196:79 15:67 24:60
15 70:80 7197:61 8:86 298:08 71:49 7197:59 8:07 297:59
16 16:60 7197:38 0:95 408:09 13:35 7197:57 0:85 412:76
17 291:35 7196:76 7391:43 0:82 292:89 7196:75 7352:58 0:82
18 44:31 7197:50 7:64 303:80 43:66 7197:52 7:52 305:86
19 16:59 7197:38 7:37 177:02 13:35 7197:57 7:18 180:91
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF NETWORK PERFORMANCE
To summarize our results of performance evaluations, when using price pairs as incentives, the localized dis-
tributed algorithm at each node correctly converges to network operating points that are optimal, for the benefits
of both individual nodes and the entire network.
VI. RELATED WORK
The problem of optimal and fair resource allocation has been extensively studied in the context of wireline
networks. Among these works, pricing has been shown to be an effective approach to achieve distributed solution
for flow control [10] [11] and service differentiation [12]. Simultaneously, game theory is applied to model resource
sharing among multiple users, e.g., [6][13].
The main difference that distinguishes our work from the existing works is rooted in the unique characteristics
of resource models of ad hoc network. First, the allocation mechanism needs to consider two types of resources,
namely, the shared channel and the private resource such as energy. Second, due to the location dependent contention
and spatial reuse of the shared channel resource, the channel price is associated with a maximal clique in the subflow
contention graph, rather than a wireline link. This presents a different pricing policy for end-to-end flows.
Incentives in wireless networks have stimulated much research interests. (e.g., in the context of ad hoc networks
[8][14][15] and in wireless LAN [16]). In particular, the works in [8] [9] present virtual credit based mechanisms
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to stimulate cooperation in ad hoc networks, where virtual credits (so called nuglets) are awarded for packet
forwarding. Some approaches [17] [18] use a reputation based mechanism where selfish or misbehaving nodes are
identified, isolated or punished. Our work distinguishes from the existing works in that, it does not only promote
cooperation in packet forwarding, more importantly, it studies at what level of cooperation the network operates at
its optimal point, and how to achieve such cooperation using pricing as incentives. Auction-based approach [19]
has also been employed for incentives in ad hoc networks. The essential idea of this approach is that each relay
node operates as a market, the users of the network put bids for their packets and will be charged accordingly,
when the packets are forwarded. As an important approach of mechanism design, auction has been shown to
have several important properties such as truthful bidding, social welfare maximization in single market. However,
directly applying this approach to ad hoc network environments, where relaying nodes constitute multiple networked
markets, these properties no longer hold. For example, user pay-off and social welfare are no longer maximized.
And how much they deviate from the optimum is not clear. Our approach instead can be shown to achieve both
user self optimization and global social welfare optimum (i.e., Nash Bargaining Solution).
Noncooperative game theory has been used to model the relaying behavior among nodes in ad hoc networks
in [14] [15]. By designing appropriate game strategies and analyzing the Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding
relaying game, these works show the existence of a network operating point where node cooperation is promoted.
In our work, Nash bargaining solution is used to characterize the global network operating point, which usually
demonstrates more advantageous properties, such as Pareto optimality and fairness, than the usual Nash Equilibrium
in a noncooperative game.
There are also previous works that address the issue of resource allocation [20] and use a price-based approach
[21]. However, the ad hoc network models in these works do not consider the shared nature of the wireless channel,
and thus their solutions are not able to capture the unique issues in wireless ad hoc networks. Moreover, the price-
based distributed algorithm presented in [20] only converges to a network optimum when its utility function takes
certain a special form, and such a utility function does not satisfy the fairness axiom.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a price pair mechanism that both regulates greedy behaviors and incentivizes selfish users
in ad hoc networks. A pair of prices is the centerpiece of this mechanism: (1) the channel price that reflects
the unique characteristics of location dependent contention in ad hoc networks, and regulates the usage of shared
wireless channel; (2) the relay price that gives incentives to reach the adequate level of cooperation with respect to
traffic relay. By using such a price pair as a signal, the decentralized self-optimizing decisions at each individual
node converges to the global network optimal operation point. Simulation results are also presented to validate our
theoretical claims. We believe that we have reached an important milestone that integrates pricing and incentives
strategies for channel access and traffic relays into the same coherent framework, which is a problem that has not
been addressed previously before this work, especially when the objective is to converge to a desirable optimal
operating point for the entire wireless ad hoc network.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
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Proof. As the objective function Eq. (35) of Nodei(i ; i ; i ) is strict concave, the problem Nodei(i ; i ; i )
has a unique solution given by,
xi = [
1
i + 

i
+ xmi ]
xMi
xmi
(51)
As the Lagrangian form for the Channel(A;C;) problem is
L(x;;p) (52)
=
X
i2N
i xi + p
(C −Ax)
at the optimum of L(x;;p) the following conditions hold:
( − p)Ax = 0 (53)
p(C −Ax) = 0 (54)
Similarly, as the Lagrangian form for the Relay(B;E;) problem is
L(x; ;p) (55)
=
X
i2N
i xi + p
(E −Bx)
at the optimum of L(x; ;p) the following conditions hold:
( − p)Bx = 0 (56)
p(E −Bx) = 0 (57)
The triple (; ;x) which satisfies conditions Eq. (27), and Eq. (28) identifies a tuple (p;x) that satisfies
condition Eq. (53) and Eq. (54) with p = , Thus it identifies a solution for Channel(A;C;) problem.
Similarly, the triple (; ;x) also identifies a tuple (p;x) that satisfies condition Eq. (56) and Eq. (57) with
p =  , Thus it identifies a solution for Relay(A;C;) problem. Moreover, note that Eq. (26) is the same as
Eq. (51), which means it is also a solution to Nodei(i ; i ; i ).
Conversely, we can construct a triple (; ;x) with  = p and  = p . Thus if xi solves Nodei(i ; 

i ; 

i )
, Channel(A;C;) and Relay(B;E;), then it satisfies Eq. (51), Eq. (53), Eq. (53), Eq. (56), and Eq. (57),
which lead to Eq. (26), Eq. (27), and Eq. (28), thus identifying a solution to P. ut
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. First, the dual objective function D() is convex, lower bounded, and continuously differentiable.
For any price vector (;) define  i(;) as
 i(;) =(
(xi(i ; 

i )− xmi )2 if 1xMi  

i + 

i  1xmi
0 otherwise
where i and 

i are defined as in (20), (21) and xi is defined as in (44).
Now we define H(;) = diag( f (;); i 2 N ) be a jN j jN j diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
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 i(;). Note that 0   i(;)  i.
Let @x@ (
;) denote the jN j  jQj Jacobian matrix whose (i; q) element is (@xi(;)@q ), where
@xi(;)
@q
= (58)(
−Aqi(xi(i ; i )− xmi )2 if 1xMi  

i + 

i  1xmi
0 otherwise
Let @x@ (
;) denote the jN j  jN j Jacobian matrix whose (i; j) element is (@xi(;)
@j
), where
@xi(;)
@j
= (59)
(
−Bji(xi(i ; i )− xmi )2 if 1xMi  

i + 

i  1xmi
0 otherwise
From (47), (48) we have,
rD(;) = C −Ax(i ; i ) (60)
rD(;) = E −Bx(i ; i ) (61)
Using (58), we have
[
@x
@
(;)] = −H(;)AT (62)
[
@x
@
(;)] = −H(;)BT (63)
Thus the Hessian of D is given as follows.
r2D(;) = AH(;)AT (64)
r2D(;) = BH(;)BT (65)
r2D(;) = AH(;)BT (66)
r2D(;) = BH(;)AT (67)
Now we show that rD is Lipschitz with
jjrD()−rD()jj2  Y Zjj − jj2 (68)
for all ;  0.
First, given any ;  0, using Taylor theorem we have
rD() −rD() = r2D(!)( − ) = (69)
for some ! = t + (1− t)  0, t 2 [0; 1].
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Hence,
jjrD() −rD()jj2  jjr2D(!)jj2  jj − jj2 (70)
Now we show that jjr2D(!)jj2  Y Z.
First
jjr2D(!)jj22  jjr2D(!)jj1  jjr2D(!)jj1 (71)
Since r2D(!) is symmetric, we have
jjr2D(!)jj1 = jjr2D(!)jj1 (72)
Hence,
jjr2D(!)jj2  jjr2D(!)jj1 = max
r
X
r0
[r2D(!)]rr0 (73)
Actually,
[r2D(!)]rr0 =8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
P
i  i(!)AriAr0i if r; r0 2 [0; Q− 1]P
i  i(!)AriB(r0−Q)i if r 2 [0; Q− 1];
r0 2 [Q;Q+N − 1]P
i  i(!)B(r−Q)fAr0i if r 2 [Q;Q+N − 1];
r0 2 [0; N − 1]P
i  i(!)B(r−Q)fB(r0−Q)i if r; r0 2 [Q;Q+N − 1]
Now we have, X
r0
[r2D(!)]rr0 =8>>>><
>>>>:
P
i
"
 i(!)Ari(
PQ−1
r0=0Ar0i
+
PN−1
r0=0 Br0i)
#
if r 2 [0; Q− 1]
P
i
"
 i(!)B(r−L)i(
PQ−1
r0=0Ar0i
+
PN−1
r0=0 Br0i)
#
if r 2
"
Q;Q+
N − 1
#
As Y (i) =
P
q Aqi +
P
j Bji, and Y = maxi2N Y (i), we have
X
r0
[r2D(!)]rr0 
(
Y
P
i  i(!)Ari if r 2 [0; Q− 1]
Y
P
i  i(!)B(r−L)i if r 2 [Q;Q+N − 1]
(74)
Also because U(q) =
P
i2N Aqi and U = maxq2Q U(q); V (j) =
P
i2N Bji and V = maxj2N V (j); Z =
maxf U; V g;  = maxi2N i, we have
max
r
X
r0
[r2D(!)]rr0  Y Z: (75)
Since the dual objective function D is lower bounded andrD is Lipschitz, then any accumulation point (; )
of the sequence ((t); (t)) generated by the gradient projection algorithm for the dual problem is dual optimal.
Provided that 0 < γ < 2= Y Z, then let ((t); (t)) be a subsequence converging to (; ). Note that
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x(; ) is continuous. Thus, the subsequence fx(t)g converges to the primal optimal rate x. ut
C. Implementation Details
The algorithm treats maximal cliques as entities that are able to perform the communication and computation tasks.
Obviously, these tasks need to be performed by the network nodes that constitute the maximal clique. As a starting
point, a decentralized algorithm to construct maximal cliques is required. Here we present a decentralized maximal
clique construction algorithm that explores the characteristics of subflow contention graphs. In this algorithm, the
network topology is decomposed into overlapping subgraphs, and maximal cliques are constructed based only on
local topological information within each of the subgraphs. Since only wireless links that are geographically close to
each other will form an edge in the wireless link contention graph, the communication and computational overhead
is significantly reduced.
To facilitate discussions, we introduce the following terms. The wireless link neighbor set LN(l) of a wireless
link l 2 L is defined as LN(l) = fl0jl \ l0 6= ;; l0 2 Lg. Similarly, the wireless link k-neighbor set LNk(l) of l is
defined by induction: (1) LN1(l) = LN(l); and (2) LNk(l) = LN(LNk−1(l)) for k > 1. For l 2 VC , we further
define SNk(l) = LNk(l) \ VC .
Let graph GC [VC(l)] be an induced subgraph of GC with VC(l) = SN2(l)  VC . Then we observe that GC [VC(l)]
contains sufficient and necessary topological information to constructQ(l) – all maximal cliques that contain wireless
link l. Q(l) can be acquired by applying the Bierstone algorithm [22] on graph GC [VC(l)]. The algorithm of the
decentralized maximal clique construction is summarized in Table VIII.
Clique Construction:
3 Construct LN3(l) and SN2(l)
4 Construct graph GC [VC(l)]
5 Use Bierstone algorithm to get all maximal
cliques that contain wireless link l
Q(l) = Bierstone(GC [VC(l)])
TABLE VIII
DECENTRALIZED CLIQUE CONSTRUCTION
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